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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROD C. SLATER,
Petitioner & Appellant,
Case No. 930443-CA

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Dept. of Human Services,
CINDY HAAG, Director, and
CHRIS MEGALONKIS, H.E.A.T.
Supervisor, et al. ,

Priority No. 15

Respondents & Appellees.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

OPENING STATEMENT
In this Reply, Appellant will respond to specific issues raised
by the Appellees in their answering Brief filed on or about February
22, 1994.

Appellant intends to, not only dispute, but dispose of

the entire argument as presented in behalf of the Appellees who
question the validity of the position taken by Appellant in his Appeal
to this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLEES' "STATEMENT OF FACTS"
DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH THE RECORD
Under "Summary of Argument" found on page 4 of Appellees' Brief,
it states: "The lower court correctly dismissed Appellant's action
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f

with prejudice1 based upon Appellant's expressed intent to voluntarily

dismiss the action and Appellant's representation that he did not intend to refile the action in the future."
"The lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Appellant's action 'with prejudice' because Appellant would be precluded
from refiling his action in the future in any event due to the statutory time limit on district court reviews of agency actions."
The foregoing is inaccurate and does not correctly reflect Appellant's position regarding the issue in question.

Beginning on line 25

of page 4, the Court Transcript reads as follows:
THE COURT: Are you telling me that at some
future date you think you intend to bring this claim
again?

This exact claim, not someting that may happen

in the future, but this claim?
MR. SLATER: There is a possibility that the same
kind of action could be filed later if the state and
the case workers for the state were to take a similar
action against me in the future. (See Transcript, p.5,
lines 4 thru 7, emphasis added).
The above response by Appellant to Judge Medley's question clearly
shows an entirely different intent of Appellant, when compared with
the wording found in Appellees' Brief under "Summary of Argument",
which is a misrepresentation of Appellant's position on this key
issue.

(See Addendum to Appellant's opening Brief at Section I)
POINT II
THE "CASES" OFFERED BY APPELLEES ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR ARGUMENT

On page 5 of Appellees' Brief under Point I of their argument,
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which is subtitled, "The Lower Court Correctly Dismissed Appellant's
Action With Prejudice", two cases are then cited, supposedly in support of the above theory.

Said cases are found in a footnote on

page 5: Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989); and Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In reviewing Cobabe v. Crawford, the primary issue presented to
this Court (Utah App. Sept., 1989), was whether attorney fees should
be awarded to the Crawfords, (Defendants & Appellants), because the
Plaintiffs had voluntarily agreed to a dismissal of their action with
prejudice.

Thus, the Defendants claimed to be the prevailing party

on appeal and entitled to attorney fees as stated in a provision of
a prior contract with Cobabe and Canfield (Plaintiffs & Respondents).
In reaching its decision, this Court reasoned as follows:
"Since defendants are entitled to reasonable
attorney fees under the contract if 'successful1,
we need only decide whether the trial court erred
in determining that there was no prevailing party
under its dismissal with prejudice. Although our
research did not reveal any Utah cases on point,
other jurisdictions have held that fa dismissal
with prejudice gives the defendant the full relief to which he (or she) is legally entitled and
is tantamount to a judgment on the merits.'" But
later adding, "(in the absence of a statutory or
contractual provision, attorney fees are improper
where dismissal is with prejudice)." (Cites and
emphasis deleted).
There are interesting aspects to study in Cobabe v. Crawford,
but that case has little or no relevancy to the case at bar.

More-

over, Appellant can see no logical reason why Cobabe should be accepted as a viable citation in support of the Appellees in the matter
at hand.

In Cobabe, a dismissal with prejudice was agreed to by both
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parties.

Conversely, in the present matter the lower Court's dismis-

sal with prejudice, adverse to Appellant, is the basic issue and reason for this Appeal.

Further, there has been no discussion concern-

ing attorney fees in the instant case nor any contractual agreement
whatsoever on that subject.
Finally, it states in the Cobabe decision that, "After two and
one-half years of litigation, plaintiffs informed the court that they
were financially unable to prosecute the action and filed a motion
to dismiss."

(See 780 P.2d at p. 835).

Again, there is little or

no relevancy that should be beneficial to the Appellees herein.

By

all indications there had been vigorous litigation for an extended
period of time in Cobabe, whereas there has been almost none in the
instant case.

The differences are numerous while similarities are

minimal.
Moving to Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex
Corp., the second case cited by Appellees under Point I of their argument, is another action appealed to this Court (July, 1987).

There

are several excerpts from the text of this decision that Appellant
would like to quote:
"The issue of dismissing an action with prejudice was recently addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc.,
728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986)." (Also cited by Appellant in his opening Brief).
". . . Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b)
is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes
a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended to
encourage the adjudication of disputes on their
merits."
". . . While courts are given great latitude and
discretion in the application of the law, they
still must have sufficient grounds to apply the
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'harsh and permanent remedy' of a dismissal with
prejudice. No such grounds appear here." (See
739 P.2d at p.1133 under point (2) and (3) of
Judge Davidson's Opinion. Emphasis added).
Once more, Appellant can see no sound reason why Appellees
would want to submit the Intermountain matter as an asset to their
argument.

Appellant believes this Court's reasoning in the Inter-

mountain decision fully supports Appellant's position in this Appeal,
and would be completely satisfied with the same result.
Since Appellees submitted only 3 citations in their defense,
Appellant will discuss their third case now, Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co. v. Benson, 563 P.2d 185, which went to the Utah Supreme Court
in April, 1977, referred to on page 1 of Appellees' Brief.

Quoting

Justice Maughan in that decision:
"This case was some sixteen months in preparation. All parties appeared at the appointed time
for trial. A jury was impaneled, and opening statements were made. At this juncture a noon recess
was called. During this recess plaintiff settled
its claim against the Bensons—the Bensons agreed
to transfer certain realty to plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff moved counts two and three of its
third-party complaint, against Ruff, be dismissed
without prejudice; . ."
" . . . Counsel for Ruff objected, and moved the
court to dismiss counts two and three with prejudice. He stated he had been some sixteen months
in preparation, and his client was there ready to
proceed. The court inquired of counsel for plaintiff, if he were ready to proceed, he said 'no',
giving the reason quoted above. Thereupon the
court took the action we have affirmed."
As clearly indicated throughout the foregoing, there is absolutely no similarity whatsoever between the Murray First Thrift case
and this case.
in preparation.

To repeat, the Murray matter "was some sixteen months
All parties appeared at the appointed time for trial.
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A jury was impaneled, and opening statements were made."

This was a

major dispute between a financial institution and several defendants
wherein trial proceedings had actually begun—not to mention a considerable amount of money involved.
Nothing, even remotely close to the Murray matter, ever took
place in the instant case.

It simply defies common sense to suggest

that the trial Court, in dismissing with prejudice, counts two and
three of Murray First Thrift's third-party complaint should have any
bearing at all in relation to this Appeal.
In his opening Brief, Appellant cited and quoted pertinent excerpts from a substantial number of cases dealing with dismissals,
and particularly where dismissals with prejudice were reversed on
appeal when questionable lower Court decisions were found to be an
abuse of judicial discretion.
If not the leading case on this subject matter, then surely a
key citation referred to repeatedly, especially in this jurisdiction,
is Westinghouse El. Sup. Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Con., Inc., 544 P.2d 876
(Utah S.Ct.1975).

Appellant also cited Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v.

Robbins, 335 P.2d 624 (Utah S.Ct.1959), another important Utah case
that Chief Justice Ellett quoted from when writing his Opinion in
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah S.Ct.1977).

And

Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017, decided in
the Utah Supreme Court in 1986, preceded by Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d
1075, decided in Utah's highest Court in 1977, are both among a chain
of cases cited by Appellant in his opening Brief that fully supports
his position in this Appeal.
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Perhaps of even greater significance, or at least of equal authority in the matter at hand, would be Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State
Univ., 813 P.2d 1216, not only because the decision closely followed
precedents established in other Utah cases, but also because it is
a very recent decision rendered in 1991 from this Court.
Appellant firmly believes that, not only are all of his Utah
cases entirely relevant and right on point in relation to the issue
presently on appeal, but also the two dozen other cases from diverse
jurisdictions, both State and Federal that were cited in his opening
Brief, should be more than sufficient in support of Appellantfs stated
position herein.
However, in response to Appellees1 answering Brief, Appellant
has taken the time to do some additional research and found several
cases from other jurisdictions that are, not only right on the mark,
but also very interesting studies in relation to this litigation.
For example, in Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning Com'n,
805 F.2d 272 (7th Cir.1986), the Court said:
". . . A thorough review of the record by this
Court has failed to produce the damning dilatory
conduct normally associated with the sanction of
dismissal." (At p.275)
" . . . The need for the district court to exercise discretion in deciding among alternative sanctions was especially great in this case, given the
plaintiff's prose status. We have previously stated: fIt is the recognized duty of the trial court
to insure that the claims of a prose (litigant) are
given a fair and meaningful consideration*. . ."
". . . The accessibility of the courts to those who
cannot afford counsel is too important a value to
be sacrificed for the needless exaction of harsh
penalties for isolated and minor mistakes." (At
p.277. Emphasis added, cites deleted)
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". . . This careful consideration is all the more
important when factors are present, such as the action
is relatively young, a litigant is proceeding prose,
or no prior warning has been given that a sanction of
dismissal will be imposed. The district court's actions here did not reflect the exercise of discretion,
but rather the abuse of it. We reverse." (At p.278,
emphasis added)
In Zuern v. Jensen, 336 N.W.2d 329 (N.D.S.Ct.1983), the Supreme
Court of North Dakota had some very firm comments to make relating
to attorney fees:
". . . It is well-settled that attorney fees are
not recoverable in an action unless expressly authorized by statute. . . Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in refusing to award attorney fees to Jensen." (Cites deleted)
". . . The foregoing section does not require costs
to be assessed against a plaintiff whose action has
been dismissed upon his own motion, nor has Jensen referred this Court to any other statutory provision
requiring costs to be so assessed." (At p.330)
Another very good case where some excellent points are made regarding the issue at hand is Webber v. Eye Corp., 721 F.2d 1067
(7th Cir.1983).

Here are some excerpts:

" . . . The sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court may apply, and its use
must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial
discretion." (At p.1069. Emphasis added, cites deleted)
". . . Moreover, the case was barely eighteen
months old when dismissed by the district court. A
dismissal with prejudice is particularly disfavored
with relatively young cases, such as the one before
us." (At p.1070. Emphasis added, cites deleted)
" . . . Finally, there is no evidence that defendant would have been unduly harmed or prejudiced had
the court granted plaintiff's request for a continuance. While defendant's witnesses may have been inconvenienced by postponing the trial, the harm to
plaintiff in being barred from presenting his case
is much greater."
" . . . While not unmindful of the ever increasing
load of litigation in all courts, both federal and
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state, we agree that courts have been created for the
very purpose of trying cases on their merits and that
dismissals with prejudice and default judgments should
not be utilized as a handy instrument for lessening the
case load burden." (At p.1071. Emphasis added)
Appellant is sure this Court will find Jackson v. Washington
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.1977), to be a very interesting
and comprehensive Opinion, written for the U.S. Court of Appeals,
D.C. Circuit, by Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, who undoubtedly
did extensive research on this case because he has included at least
fifty (50) citations throughout voluminous footnotes.
is an estimate—too many to count).

(Fifty cites

Here is what Judge Robinson said

in his closing remarks:
" . . . When the client has not personally misbehaved and his opponent in the litigation has not been
harmed, the interests of justice are better served by
an exercise of discretion in favor of appropriate action against the lawyer as the medium for vindication
of the judicial process and protection of the citizenry
from future imposition. Public confidence in the legal system is not enhanced when one component punishes
blameless litigants for the misdoings of another component of the system; to laymen unfamiliar with the
fundamentals of agency law, that can only convey the
erroneous impression that lawyers protect other lawyers at the expense of everyone else." (At p.123-124.
Emphasis added—makes sense to me.)
In Stevens v. Red Barn Chemicals, Inc., 76 F.R.D. Ill (1977),
the Court said in this case:
" . . . From the record before the Court in the instant case, the Court is unable to conclude that dismissal with prejudice is warranted. Accordingly, Defendant's request for the same should be overruled.
Likewise, Defendant's request that the dismissal herein be upon the condition that Plaintiffs must refile
this action in this Court or be barred from further
relief should also be overruled for the reason that
the Court is unwilling to prevent Plaintiffs from litigating their cause of action in any forum made available to them by state or federal statutes." (At p.113)
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Another comprehensive, well written Opinion is found in Gideon v.
Bo-Mar Homes, Inc., 469 P.2d 272 (S.Ct. of Kan.1970).

Under point 6

of a syllabus, the Court said:
"..(1) The district court abused its judicial discretion by failing to apply the appropriate legal and
equitable principles to the conceded facts and circumstances, and (2) the defendants would not be subjected
to plain 'legal prejudice1 so as to preclude voluntary
dismissal by the plaintiffs without prejudice upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
it might deem proper." (At p.274)
11

. . . n o discovery was had upon it and at the time
the plaintiffs' motion for dismissal without prejudice
was filed, the case was barely at issue. ." (At p.277)
11

. . . Unless otherwise specified in the order, a
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. ."
(At p.276, emphasis added)
11

. . . Moreover, the authorities are agreed that
the gain of a tactical advantage of whatever nature is
not legal prejudice. . ." (At p.278, emphasis added)
,f

. . .'(i)t has already been decided that the inconvenience or anticipated prejudice to defendant does not
warrant denial of plaintiffs' withdrawal.' . ." (At
p.278, emphasis added)
The following case is a rare instance where a Petition for a
writ of mandamus is successful.
(S.Ct. of Ariz.1968).

See Goodman v. Gordon, 447 P.2d 230

Here are some closing excerpts from Chief Jus-

tice McFarland writing for the Arizona Supreme Court in banc:
". . . and a court's failure to consider the plaintiff's equities is a 'denial of a full and complete
exercise of judicial discretion.'. ." (At p.232)
" . . . While expenses may properly be made a condition of granting a dismissal, omission of such condition is not an arbitrary act." (At p.232, cites
deleted, emphasis added)
" . . . In our opinion only the most extraordinary
circumstances will justify the trial court in refusing to grant a motion by a plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice. . ." (At p.233, emphasis added)
The next case is Independent Productions Corp v. Loew's Incorporated, 283 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir.1960), wherein more than twenty (20)
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big New York City law firms were involved.

Here are two closing

passages:
11

. . . The dismissal of an action with prejudice
or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic
remedies, and should be applied only in extreme
circumstances. . . TIn final analysis, a court has
the responsibility to do justice between man and
man, and general principles cannot justify denial
of a party's fair day in court except upon a serious showing of willful default.1. ." (At p.733,
cites deleted, emphasis added)
The last case in this group is Kuzma v. Bessemer & Lake Erie
Railroad, 259 F.2d 456 (3rd Cir.1958).

In a per curiam Opinion, the

Third Circuit said this:
". . . The trial judge indicated that he did not
wish to preclude the plaintiff from having his day
in court in the Ohio case. But a dismissal with prejudice or even a dismissal without qualification under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the
merits by the very words of the rule. And an unfavorable adjudication on the merits in Pennsylvania
would, of course, be a complete defense on the grounds of res judicata to the suit pending in Ohio."
(At p.457)
It should be noted in the foregoing, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated essentially what Appellant
has endeavored to point out from the outset of this Appeal.

That is:

". . . a dismissal with prejudice or even a dismissal without qualification under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits
by the very words of the rule."

Therefore, such an adverse dismis-

sal means that the Courts will automatically impose res judicata on
any future action involving the same parties wherein the suit is
based on the same grounds.

/ / / /
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POINT III
THE STATE "STATUTES" SUBMITTED BY
THE APPELLEES ARE LARGELY IRRELEVANT
Turning to Point II of Appellees1 argument, including a rather
lengthy subtitle which reads: "The Lower Court's Dismissal With Prejudice Was Not an Abuse of Discretion in Light of the Statutory Time
Limit Prohibiting Appellant's Action in the Future."

Point II then

begins:
"The essence of Appellant SLater's argument appears
to be that the lower court's dismissal 'with prejudice'
will bar Slater's access to the courts. Appellant's
Br. at 31-32. Slater's argument fails to recognize that,
regardless of whether his action is dismissed with or
without prejudice, this particular action will be barred from the courts as a result of the statutory time
limit on district court reviews of informal agency actions." (Emphasis included, cite deleted)
Appellant quoted verbatim this particular part of Appellees'
argument because it represents a specific theory of contention found
throughout their Brief.

When it is stated that ". . . this particu-

lar action will be barred from the courts as a result of the statutory time limit on district court reviews of informal agency actions"
Appellant can agree with that statement.

That is, when referring

to "this particular action."
But what about another action next year, or the year after that,
which is not only similar to this cause of action, but almost identical?

Then what?

If the present action is dismissed without preju-

dice, Appellant would be free to turn to the Courts if he could not
resolve a similar dispute in the Administrative Branch of State government.

But if the present action is dismissed with prejudice,

Appellant would be forever barred from seeking relief in the Courts
on the same kind of action.

It wouldn't have to be the same action
-12-

to be barred; only the same kind, type, form of action involving the
same parties.

Namely, this Appellant filing a Petition in District

Court seeking relief based on the same grounds against the same State
agency or administrators who handle the H.E.A.T. Program.
Neither this Court nor counsel for the defense needs a lecture
on the deadly force of res judicata.

Even this prose litigant is

well aware of its power legally, analogous to double jeopardy. "..The
sum and substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially
decided is finally decided.."

(See Black's, Fifth Edition, p.1174

under "Res").
So Appellant knows that when Appellees try to present an argument involving "statutory time limits", this merely clouds the real
issue in an effort to make it appear that a dismissal 'with' prejudice is really not that bad.

As it was phrased in their Brief on

p.7 ". . Therefore, whether the district court dismissed Slater's
action with or without prejudice is 'inconsequential'. ."

However,

returning to p.5 of Appellees' Brief, footnote 2 begins with this:
"A dismissal with prejudice is tantamount to a judgment on the merits and prevents future consideration of
the claims." (Cites deleted, emphasis added)
Our State Appellees cannot have it both ways.

A dismissal with

prejudice is either "inconsequential" or a very serious matter "tantamount to a judgment on the merits. ."

Appellant firmly reasserts

that it's the latter:
". . Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b)
is a harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes
a presentation of a plaintiff's claims on their
merits. ." (See Bonneville Tower v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d at p.1020 (Utah S.Ct.1986)
". . The sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court may apply. ." (See
-13-

Webber v. Eye Corp., 721 F.2d at p.1069 (7th Cir.1983).
In the Webber case, the 7th Circuit also said, ". . A
dismissal with prejudice is particularly disfavored
with relatively young cases, such as the one before
us." (At p.1070. Emphasis added in foregoing quotes)
Facts Relating to
the Origin of This Case
Before concluding, Appellant believes some additional information would be helpful regarding the origin of this case, and particularly since Appellees chose to cover some of the basics in that connection, found on pages 3 and 4 of their Brief, primarily concerning
the H.E.A.T. Program.
It is correctly pointed out in Appellees' Brief that ". . Appellant Slater's application for HEAT assistance was approved. .tf

Also

correct in their Brief is the fact that the dispute arose over the
"amount of assistance" which the local H.E.A.T. supervisor insisted
must be sharply reduced, because in Appellant's apartment building
the basic source of heat came from steam radiators.
Even though Appellant has been living in the same basement apartment, right next to the boiler room since 1981, it became an exercise
in futility to try and explain to Chris Megalonkis (local H.E.A.T.
supervisor) that the fuel to the boiler furnace was natural g a s —
which is expensive—and classified under the H.E.A.T. Program as a
high priority fuel, second only to electricity, which Appellant also
used periodically in a space heater, in addition to the steam heat.
Thus, Appellant's source of fuel for heat came under a more expensive category within the Program, and not to be confused with
less costly coal, wood or oil.

Still, the local H.E.A.T. office took

exactly the opposite position, refusing to accept the word of a
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tenant who had lived in the same building for over 11 years!

And that

ill-conceived decision at the local level was erroneously upheld by
an administrative hearing officer on April 20, 1992, followed by Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review of an Administrative Order
filed on June 1, 1992.
There are numerous statutes, codes and a multitude of regulations
that govern the H.E.A.T. Program, some of which are listed in Appelleess1 Brief under "Table of Authorities" and cited in later segments.
Appellant has been certain for some time that he was well within his
rights and fully supported by regulatory authority, particularly by
the most important Administrative Codes, two of which were not discussed in Appellees' Brief, namely: R513-602-218. Vulnerability, ii. "Households who are currently paying energy costs indirectly through rent."
And, R513-606-608. "Determination of the Primary Fuel Type."
As just stated, Appellant was confident that he would prevail if
he pressed his Petition forward, because, not only were the facts
clearly in Appellant's favor, but also the governing regulations as
well.

On the other hand, there were also sound reasons why Appellant

chose to dismiss his cause of action when that Motion was filed.

Ap-

pellant's health had improved considerably following open heart surgery, along with a much better income compared with the recent past.
So why burden the Court or the Respondents now if it wasn't mandatory
to do so?

Furthermore, if assistance was needed from the H.E.A.T. Pro-

gram later on, perhaps the local office would have reconsidered its
earlier position.

If not, the case could then be re-opened and pressed

to a favorable result.
All of the foregoing were sound reasons for moving for a dis-15-

missal when that Motion was filed.

Likewise, it was also sound reason-

ing to appeal the lower Court Order dismissing Appellant's action with
prejudice, because, if that Order were allowed to stand, Appellant's
acquiescence would suggest his consent.

More accurately, any form

of passive compliance would be a defeat by default.

Never, for one

moment, has Appellant ever seriously considered inaction or submission
to such an arbitrary and unreasonable decision as the irrational dismissal in this case issued by the Court below.
Appellant's appeal to this Court is not based on the original
dispute between himself and the Appellees.

No, Appellant filed a Mo-

tion in good faith in the Court below to dismiss that action a year
ago this month.

However, the lower Court adversely decreed that Ap-

pellant should be punished for moving for a dismissal of his action.
In fact, punished severely by a Court Order to dismiss the case with
prejudice, thereby denying Appellant any opportunity to ever refile
a similar action against the same Defendants in the future—if such
action were based on the same grounds.

This was a very biased, un-

fair and unwarranted lower Court decision and the principle reason
for this Appeal.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, why should the State Appellees pursue
such an unjust cause?
Or protecting?

What is their purpose?

Who are they defending?

What possible damage would the State suffer if Appel-

lant were to prevail in this Appeal?
First of all, Appellant was unsuccessful in his effort to overturn an adverse decision made at the local level of State government.
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Appellant failed again when the matter was appealed to a hearing process at a higher Administrative level.

Appellant then petitioned for

relief from a District Court, but later decided to voluntarily dismiss his Petition.

Thus, for a third time the State Appellees pre-

vailed, all of which was accomplished with scarcely no legal expenditure, either in time or effort other than filing a very short, simple
Answer consisting of less than a full page of written material (four
7-word denials and a line and one-half alleging Appellant had failed
to state a claim.

See Appellant's Addendum to his opening Brief at

Section IV, Respondents1 "Answer to Petition").
Now, with no defeats, while enjoying nothing but success after
3 very brief legal encounters with Appellant, it appears the State
Appellees won't be satisfied until Appellant's legitimate cause of
action and well founded Appeal to this Court are, not only defeated,
but destroyed.
Again, what could possibly be the State's purpose in pursuing
such an unjust cause?

The District Court not only erred, but commit-

ted a flagrant abuse of judicial discretion in this matter.

Appel-

lant has submitted a substantial, if not overwhelming number of solid
case citations in support of his position in this Appeal.
There is absolutely no"legal, ethical or moral reason why the
prejudicial dismissal issued by the Court below should be upheld.
What could possibly be advantages in behalf of the State to protect
the District Court in this matter?

Surely, it cannot be in defense

of the rights of this State's citizens, because the lower Court decision in question represents a denial of basic rights which should
be guaranteed under both our State and Federal Constitutions, par-
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ticularly the right of Due Process, Equal Protection, and the right
to Petition for a Redress of Grievances.
Any judicial decision that clearly denies such basic rights,
must be reversed; not only in behalf of Appellant's cause, but in
the interst of justice—justice for this community, this State, and
to help restore a spark of renewed faith in our overloaded, underfunded judicial system.
Appellant is standing firm against an abusive judicial action
that, if permitted to go unchallenged, would eventually lead to the
judiciary running roughshod over the civil rights of everyone—rights
that must be diligently protected—if not by the Courts, then by each
and every citizen who believes in our form of government.
Ironically, as a matter of legal principle, the present issue
before this Court is of far greater importance in relation to fundamental rights, when compared to the original controversey between
Appellant and these governmental Appellees.

In order to preserve and

protect those basic rights, Appellant must prevail in this Appeal.
The Order issued by the Court below is discriminatory, a misuse
of power that is contrary to both principle and precedent.
be reversed.
DATED this j P y ^ ^ d a y of May, 1994.
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It must
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